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STATEMENT 01; THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Donald Ray Yarber appeals following a jury's guilty verdicts on five felony counts of 
video voyeurism and two misdemeanor charges. On appeal, he asserts that the district court 
erred in denying his motion for acquittal and that the evidence presented was not sufficient to 
support the jury's verdicts on the video voyeurism charges. Mr. Yarber also asserts the district 
court erred in allowing prior bad act and other character evidence to be admitted at trial. Finally, 
Mr. Yarber submits that the district court abused its discretion and imposed an excessive 
sentence, particularly with regard to the five year consecutive sentences on three of the video 
voyeurism charges, and his status as a first-time offender. 
B. Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Yarber and his partner of 14 years ("K.B. '') ended their relationship around the end 
of June 2013 when K.B. moved out of the apmiment they shared. (Tr., pp. 236-37.) They spent 
the "next few months ... in limbo trying to figure out if (they] wanted to get back together." 
(Tr., p. 236, Ls. 18-20.) During this time, in August of 2013 1, K.B. took pictures of her "intimate 
areas", including her buttocks, vaginal area, and breasts, and sent them to Mr. Yarber. (Tr., p. 
242.) She testified that she took the pictures for a "sexual purpose", to "appeal to" Mr. Yarber, 
because "[h]e liked them and [they] had been together for a long time". (Tr., p. 243, Ls. 14-22.) 
She testified that she did not "think he necessarily asked (her] for them." (Tr., p. 244, Ls. 2-6). 
1 K.B. did not remember exactly when she sent the pictures to Mr. Yarber, but testified that he 
had already moved from Boise to New York when she sent them and that he had moved to New 
York at the beginning of August. (Tr., p. 243, Ls. 7-10.) 
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After K.B. cut off contact with Mr. Yarber, he felt "horrible", "did not know "how to 
handle it", wanted to "get her attention", and tried to "get back at her for not responding to 
[him]". (Tr., p. 462, L. 9 p. 463, L. 8). Unfortunately, between September 11 and 19, 2013, 
Mr. Yarber sought to get her attention and response by calling her hundreds of times, and then 
posting the intimate pictures K.B. sent to him in August in Craigslist ads in the "Casual 
Encounters" section of that website, without her permission. (Tr., pp. 245-53; 327-28). Several 
individuals responded to these ads, some including intimate pictures of themselves, and others 
suggesting sexual encounters or seeking to meet up in person with K.B. (Tr., pp. 346-50.) 
On February 4, 2014, the Grand Jury considered eight charges against Mr. Yarber 
stemming from this conduct. (Tr. 2/4/14, p. 3 ). That same day, the State of Idaho ("the State") 
filed an Indictment, charging Mr. Yarber with six felony counts of video voyeurism (Idaho Code 
§ 18-6609), a misdemeanor charge of using a telephone to annoy, harass and/or offend (Idaho 
Code § 18-6710), and a misdemeanor charge of disturbing the peace (Idaho Code § 18-6409). (R., 
pp. 36-40.) The focus of Mr. Yarber's appeal is the video voyeurism charges. 
The district court denied trial counsel's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment (R., p. 52; Tr., 
pp. 21-22), and the case proceeded to trial on May 12-15, 2014. During trial, the district court 
denied Mr. Yarber' s oral Idaho Criminal Rule 29 motion for acquittal. The district court also 
allowed evidence of (I) Mr. Yarber' s responses to ads placed in the Craigslist "Casual 
Encounters" section accomplished around the same time he posted the ads with the pictures of 
K.B., and (2) Craigslist posting with K.B.'s pictures made in January, 2014, several months after 
the conduct in September of 2013 on which the charges are based. The jury ultimately returned 
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guilty verdicts on both of the misdemeanor charges and on five of the six video voyeurism 
counts, reporting they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict on Count Six. (Tr., pp. 535-38.) 
The district court sentenced Mr. Yarber to the maximum penalty of five years in prison, 
with all five years fixed, on Count One; a consecutive five year tem1, with two years fixed, on 
Count Two, another consecutive five year term consisting of five years indeterminate, on Count 
Three, concurrent five year indeterminate terms on Counts Four and Five, and concurrent terms 
of one year on Count Seven, and six months on Count Eight. (R., pp. 143-45.) Mr. Yarber filed 
timely motion under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, seeking a reduction of his sentences (R., p.169), 
which the district court denied without a hearing. (R., pp. 170-74). He timely appeals from the 
Judgment of Conviction and Commitment entered on July 2, 2014. (R., pp. 142-46; 153-55.)2 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Yarber's oral Idaho Criminal Rule 29 
motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence presented to the jury was insufficient to 
convict him of the video voyeurism charges? 
2 Mr. Yarber has not appealed from the district court's denial of his Rule 35 motion because 
"[ w ]hen presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in 
light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of 
the Rule 35 motion." State v. Huffman, 159 P.3d 838,840, 144 Idaho 201,203 (2007). Here, as 
the district court found, Mr. Yarber's trial counsel filed "nothing in support of his motion", and 
thereby submitted no new or additional information for the court to consider. (R .. , pp. 171-72.) 
And, "[aJn appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion cannot be used as a vehicle to review the 
underlying sentence absent the presentation of new information. Huffman, 159 P.Jd at 840,144 
Idaho at 203. 
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rI. Did the district court err in allowing evidence of(!) Mr. Yarber's Craigslist use 
unrelated to his posting of the ads with K.B.' s pictures and (2) his posting of another Craigslist 
ad with K.B.' s pictures months aner the conduct the time when the charged conduct occurred? 
III. Did the district court abuse its discretion and impose an excessive sentence when 
it imposed a sentence that included three consecutive five year sentences --- one with five years 
fixed, another with two years fixed, three years indeterminate, and a third with five years 
indeterminate--- upon Mr. Yarber' s convictions for video voyeurism? 
ARGUMENT 
I. There is Insufficient Evidence to Support the Video Voyeurism Charges 
A. Intrnduction 
The trial couti denied trial counsel's oral motion for judgment of acquittal made pursuant 
to Idaho Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 (Tr., p. 419; p. 425, Ls. 11 15). This motion was based 
on trial counsel's argument that the State had not demonstrated the intent necessary to support 
convictions on the video voyeurism charges. The district court ruled that the State had provided 
sufficient evidence, including K.B.'s testimony and the tape recording of Mr. Yarber's police 
interview, to show that he disseminated the pictures. (Tr., p. 423, L. 23 p. 424, L. 10.) The 
court also found that, even if Mr. Yarber had "dual purposes" in posting the images, one reason 
he put the pictures on Craigslist is because men "get horny" looking at these kinds of pictures. 
(Tr., p. 424, Ls. 16-22). Additionally, the court found relevant that the individuals responding to 
the ads "were sexually aroused". (Tr., p. 424, L. 23 p. 425, L. 7.) Mr. Yarber appeals from the 
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trial court's denial of his Rule 29 motion and argues there was insufficient evidence to convict 
him on the video voyeurism charges. 
B. Standards of Review 
Following the State's presentation of its case, Mr. Yarber's counsel moved for a 
judgment of acquittal on sufficiency of the evidence grounds. The test applied when reviewing 
the district court's ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is to determine whether the 
evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction of the crime charged. State v. Fields, 127 Idaho 
904, 912-13, 908 P.2d 1211, 1219---20 (1995). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence 
where a j udgmcnt of conviction has been entered upon a jury verdict, the evidence is sufficient to 
support the jury's guilty verdict if there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of 
fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements 
of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Herrera-Brito, 131 Idaho 383, 385, 957 P.2d 
1099, 1101 (Ct.App. 1998); State v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101,104,822 P.2d 998, 1001 (Ct.App. 
1991 ). "[A] verdict cannot rest on speculation or conjecture." Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46 
(Ct. App. 1992) ( citing Petersen v. Parry, 92 lclaho 647, 652 (1968)). 
The Court does not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the 
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
from the evidence. Knutson, 121 Idaho at 104,822 P.2d at 1001; State v. Decker, 108 Idaho 683, 
684, 70 I P.2d 303, 304 (Ct.App. 1985). And, the Court considers the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prosecution. Herrera--Brito, 13 l Idaho at 385, 957 P.2d at 1101; Knutson, 121 
Idaho at 104, 822 P.2d at 100 I. However, whether a trial court properly applied a statutory 
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provision to the facts of a particular case is a question of law over which the Court exercises free 
review. /)'tale v. Horn, 124 Idaho 849, 850, 865 P.2d 176, 177 (Ct.App. 1993). 
C. Argument 
In support of Mr. Yarber' s Ruic 29 motion, trial counsel argued that the jury could not 
find "beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the images were created they were created for 
the purpose of posting them on Craigslist by the defendant later." (Tr., p. 419, Ls. 13-18.) Trial 
counsel explained that the statute requires the images to have been created for the same purpose 
for which they were ultimately used. (Tr., p. 419, Ls. 20-24.) The plain language of the statute3 
supports trial counsel's argument. The version of Idaho Code Section 18-6609(2 )(b) in effect at 
the time of Mr. Yarber's trial provided: 
(2) A person is guilty of video voyeurism when, with the intent of 
arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual 
desires of such person or another person, or for his own or another 
person's lascivious entertainment or satisfaction of prurient 
interest, or for the purpose of sexually degrading or abusing any 
other person: 
(b) He intentionally disseminates, publishes or sells any image or 
images of the intimate areas of another person or persons without 
the consent of such other person or persons and with knowledge 
that such image or images were obtained with the intent set forth 
above. 
3 The interpretation of a statute is question of law, over which appellate courts exercise free 
review. State v. Hart, 135 Idaho 827, 829 (2001 ). Statutory interpretation begins with the literal 
words of the statute and those words are "given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning", and 
the statute must be construed as a whole." Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'! Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 
889,893 (2011). "If the statute is not ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply 
follows the law as written." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Id. (2004) (emphasis added). Accordingly, there are two specific intent clements in the statute. 
First, the image must be intentionally disseminated, with knowledge that the image was obtained 
with the ''intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual desires of 
such person or another person, or for his own or another person's lascivious entertainment or 
satisfaction of prurient interest" (hereinafter "appealing to the sexual desires of his own or 
another person"). As trial counsel pointed out in support of his Rule 29 motion, Mr. Yarber "had 
nothing to do with creating" the images and the purpose they were later put to "had nothing to do 
with their creation." (Tr., p. 420, Ls. 1-5.) 
One way to look at the issue is to consider whether a video voyeurism charge under the 
2004 version of thc: statute can be supported when the pictures were taken by one individual with 
one specific intent, but the later publication or posting of those pictures was accomplished by a 
different individual with a different intent. The statute appears to require that the pictures be 
obtained and disseminated with the same intent. Regardless, K.B. took the pictures of herself, on 
her own. At trial, K.B. testified that she "knew" that Yarber liked the pictures, but said "I don't 
think he necessarily asked me for them." (Tr., p. 244, Ls. 4-6.) Mr. Yarber was not present 
when she took the pictures. (Tr., p. 305, Ls. 5-8). Additionally, this was not the only time she 
had ever taken these types of pictures. (Tr., p. 243, Ls. 11-13.) Accordingly, although she may 
have created the images with the intent of "of arousing, appealing to or gratify the lust or 
passions or sexual desires" of herself or another person, this does not establish Mr. Yarber' s 
intent when he received the pictures K.B. willingly sent to him. Nor does that intent necessarily 
match up with the intent with which they were disseminated by Mr. Yarber. 
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The Court of Appeals, in a case charging video voyeurism with a different type of intent 
than that charged here, addressed the intent clement of the 2004 version of the statute. S'tate v. 
McLellan, 154 Idaho 77, 78, 294 P.3d 203, 204 (Ct. App. 2013). The appellate court in 
McLellan agreed that the trial court properly found probable cause was lacking for a video 
voyeurism charge, upholding the district court's determination that "the state failed to present 
any evidence on the intent of [the defendant] when he obtained the video-a material clement of 
the crime." State v. McLellan, 154 Idaho 77, 78, 294 P.3d 203, 204 (Ct. App. 2013). Here, the 
evidence points to K.B.'s intent in sending the photos to Mr. Yarber, and she testified she took 
the pictures for a "sexual purpose", to "appeal to" Mr. Yarber, because "[h]e liked them and 
[they] had been together for a long time". (Tr., p. 243, Ls. 14-22.) However, her intent to take 
the pictures for a sexual purpose docs not demonstrate Mr. Yarber's intent. K.B. took the 
pictures and sent them to Mr. Yarber. That she might have met the statute's intent element by 
creating the pictures in an attempt to appeal to Mr. Yarber's sexual desires does not necessarily 
establish that Mr. Yarber had the intent required by the statute. 
Even if there is sufficient evidence of Mr. Yarber's intent in "obtaining" the images, and 
the Court determines that the intent for both disseminating and obtaining the images need not be 
identical, the weight of the evidence in the record indicates that Mr. Yarber posted the images on 
Craigslist to get K. B. 's attention and as revenge for her ending their relationship and not talking 
to him. Although he may have been aware that these types of images make men "horny", his 
testimony indicates that he did not disseminate the pictures for that purpose, but rather to get 
Appellant's Opening Brief - 8 
IJ It 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
back at K.B. and get her attention. Not a laudable reason, but at the time he was charged, this 
type of intent was not sufficient to support a video voyeurism charge. 
Indeed, around the time Mr. Yarber was sentenced in July 2014, the Idaho legislature 
amended the video voyeurism statute for the following purpose: 
The law is in place to protect privacy of individuals. Currently, the 
law is narrowly tailored to combat the sharing of images that are 
used for sexual gratification when there is not consent to do so. 
The law does not address the use of pictures or videos of an 
intimate or private nature that are shared without consent for other 
purposes that are just as damaging as sexual gratification, such as 
revenge, extortion or humiliation. This proposed legislation would 
provide protections in those instances. 
Second Regular Session of the Sixty-Second Idaho Legislature, House Bill 563, Statement of 
Purpose, RS22978 (2014 ), available at http:/ /legislature.idaho.gov/legislation/20 l 4/H0563 .htm 
(site last visited Mar. 4, 2015). The 2014 version of the statute also modified the intent 
requirement, allowing for "reckless disregard" and ·'reasonably should have known'' to satisfy 
the intent requirements, as noted in the redlined version copied below: 
(2) A person is guilty of video voyeurism when, : 
(a) Ww-ith the intent of arousing, appealing to or gratifying the lust or passions or sexual 
desires of such person 
or another person, or for his own or another person's lascivious entertainment or satisfaction 
of prurient interest, or for the purpose of sexually degrading or abusing any other person~ 
&>-, he uses, installs or permits the use or installation of an imaging device at a place where 
a person would have a reasonable expectation of privacy, without the knowledge or consent 
of the person using such place; or 
(b) He either intentionally or with reckless disregard disseminates, publishes or sells 
or conspires to disseminate, publish or sell any image or images of the intimate areas of 
another person or persons without the consent of such other person or persons and with 
knovlledge he knows or reasonably should have known that such image or images ,vere 
obtained with the intent set forth above one (1) or both parties agreed or 
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under-stood that the images should remain private. 
Ben Ysursa, General Laws of the State of fdaho Passed by the Second Regular Session of the 
Sixty-Second Idaho Legislature, Vo I. 1, pp. 4 77-78 (2014 ), available at 
http://lcgislature.idaho.gov/sessioninfo/2014/sessionlaws.htm ( site last visited Mar. 4, 2015). 
This provides further support for applying the statute the way Mr. Yarber' s trial counsel 
proposed in his Rule 29 motion argument as the legislature sought to modify the statute after the 
Mclellan decision and removed the "obtained with the intent language" of the 2004 version of 
the statute. See supra, 154 Idaho 77, 294 P.3d 203. 
In short, the evidence was insufficient to establish that Mr. Yarber possessed the intent 
necessary to convict him of video voyeurism under the 2004 version of the statute. 
II. The Trial Court Erred in Allowing Evidence of Mr. Yarher's General Craigslist Use 
and His Posting of Another Ad With K.B.'s Pictures in January of 2014. 
A. Introduction 
The State filed two notices of intent to use Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) to introduce 
evidence to establish Defendant's intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake or accident in the 
State's case in chief. The notices related to: 
1. a January 4, 2014 posting on Craigslist that includes the pictures ofK.B.; 
2. "evidence of a general nature" that Mr. Yarber used Craigslist to attempt to meet 
women, and that he responded to two Craigslist advertisements with pictures of his penis. 
(R., pp. 62-63; 76-80.) The State argued in the alternative that this evidence is not Rule 404(b) 
evidence because it was intrinsic to the charged offense. 5'ee R., p. 78 {relying on State v. Pullin, 
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152 Idaho 82, 86-87, 266 P.3d 1187, 1191-92 (Ct. App. 2011)). Additionally, the State argues 
the evidence should be admitted under the doctrine of res gestae because it amounts to "other 
acts that occur during the commission of or in close temporal proximity to the charged offense 
which must be described to complete the story of the crime on trial by placing it in the context of 
nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings." R., p. 79 ( quoting State v. Blackstead, 126 
Idaho 14, 18 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Mr. Yarber's trial counsel objected to admission of this evidence. See Tr., pp. 52-71. 
The district court concluded that the evidence of Mr. Yarber's Craigslist searches "to hook up 
with somebody sexually" around the same time he is posting the ads with K.B.' s pictures is part 
of the "res gestae" and that they are relevant to demonstrate his knowledge that Craigslist can be 
used for sexual purposes and his intent. (Tr., p. 66, L. 23 p. 68, L. 25). The district court also 
determined that the January 4, 2014 Craigslist ad using K.B.'s pictures is evidence that Mr. 
Yarber was posting the pictures for a sexual purpose himself and that because he did not send the 
responses to K.B., it does not appear that he was posting the ads for revenge for her ending their 
relationship. (Tr., p. 69.) The district court also found under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403 that 
the probative value of this information was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice. (Tr., pp.69-70.) The testimony was admitted at trial.4 
4 On direct examination at trial, City of Boise Detective Charles LeBar testified that around the 
same time Mr. Yarber was posting the Craigslist advertisements with K.B.' s pictures he also was 
using Craigslist "to find someone ... to have sex with." (Tr., p. 321, Ls. 5-15). Detective LeBar 
went on to confirm that, based on his review of Mr. Yarber's email records, Mr. Yarber was 
"proficient in the use of Craigslist for sexual purposes." (Tr., p. 324, Ls. 33-6.) Testimony also 
was introduced about the January 4, 2014 Craigslist posting. (Tr., pp. 395-96.) 
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B. Standards of Review 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a defendant's 
criminal propensity. Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b ); State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667, 227 
P.3d 918,921 (2010); State v. Parmer, 147 Idaho 210,214,207 P.3d 186, 190 (Ct.App. 2009). 
However, such evidence may be admissible for a purpose other than that prohibited by Idaho 
Rules of Evidence 404(b).5 Panner, 147 Idaho at 214, 207 P.3d at 190. To detennine the 
admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts, a two-level analysis is applied: (1) the evidence must 
be relevant; and (2) the probative value must substantially outweigh any unfair prejudice to the 
defendant. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009). Relevancy requires 
that the prior bad act evidence is relevant to a material, disputed issue concerning the crime 
charged, other than criminal propensity. Id. Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of law. 
Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667,227 P.3d at 921; Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214,207 P.3d at 190. When 
considering admission of evidence of prior bad acts, the Court exercises free review of the trial 
court's relevancy detennination. Parmer, 147 Idaho at 214, 207 P.3d at 190. The trial court's 
balancing of the probative value of the evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice will not be 
disturbed unless the court abused its discretion. State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176, 190, 254 P .3d 
77, 91 (Ct.App.2011). 
5 "It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, provided that 
the prosecution in a criminal case shall file and serve notice reasonably in advance of trial, or 
during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any 
such evidence it intends to introduce at trial." Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b ). 
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C. Argument 
First, this case is not similar to the Pullin case, in which the Idaho Court of Appeals 
determined that evidence found inside of the car at the time of arrest on a particular charge "was 
not evidence of a prior crime, wrong, or other act, but was merely part of the same criminal 
episode." S'tate v. Pullin, 152 Idaho 82, 86-87, 266 P.3d 1187, 1191-92 (Ct. App. 2011). The 
court in Pullin considered that "the search of the vehicle occurred directly after the search of 
Pullin's person, and was part of the search incident to his arrest." Id. Here, the images of Mr. 
Yarber' s search of and response to other women's Craigslist postings, near the same time he was 
posting the ads with K.B. · s pictures, is not '·inextricably intertwined," or "part of a single 
criminal episode,'" or '·a necessary preliminary to the crime charged," such that it should not be 
considered Rule 404(b) evidence. S'ee State v. Sheldon, 145 Idaho 225, 226-29, 178 P.3d 28, 28-
32 (2008). Indeed, Mr. Yarber' s conduct in contacting women through Craigslist is not 
"criminal'' so it could not be part of a "criminal episode". Nor is a necessary preliminary to the 
crime of video voyeurism or inextricably entwined with that distinct conduct. Additionally, the 
January 4, 2014 advertisement was separated by almost four months from the charged conduct. 
For similar reasons, the evidence should not have been admitted under the doctrine of res 
gestae. While Mr. Yarber' s general Craigslist use may have been close in temporal proximity to 
his posting of the ads with K.B., Mr. Yarber submits it does not "complete the story of the 
crime". See State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 18 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). 
Moreover, under the 404(b) analysis, the evidence does not sufficiently relate to his 
knowledge or intent. Mr. Yarber did not dispute that he posted the ads with K.B. in September 
Appellant's Opening Brief - 13 
or that he knew how to use Craigslist or what the postings in the "Casual Encounters" section 
were used for. And, even if the circumstances surrounding the January 4th posting made it 
appear he was not posting to get revenge on K.B. for ending their relationship (because he did 
not forward the responses to her), it does not make it more likely that four months earlier, in 
September, when he was forwarding the ad responses to her, he was doing it for a sexual 
purposes and not because he wanted her attention. All that the circumstances surrounding the 
January 4, 2014 ad suggest is that, at that time, a time when his break-up was not new, he may 
have been acting with a purpose other than to get K.B.'s attention. Using that to show his intent 
with regard to the September postings is not closely related in time, occurred in a different 
pattern than the September postings, and docs not reflect on Mr. Yarber' s state of mind during 
September. And, Mr. Yarber was not charged with a crime related to the January 4, 2014 
posting. 
Finally, even if the district court appropriately found the evidence is relevant, "the 
probative value of the evidence in relation to intent or lack of mistake or accident must outweigh 
the prejudice to the defendant." State v. McAvoy, No. 37393, 2012 WL 9490082, at *2 (Idaho 
Ct. App. Mar. 1, 2012). Mr. Yarber submits that the evidence introduced here was unfairly 
prejudicial. His activity in seeking out companionship, or a perhaps sexual connection, from 
other women on Craigslist may have made it appear that he was doing something wrong in 
simply trying to meet women on Craigslist. It had no connection to his desire to get K.B. 's 
attention by posting her pictures on Craigslist. 
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Ill. The Sentences as Structured Were Excessive and Amount to an Abuse of Discretion 
Mr. Yarber submits that the trial court abused its discretion and imposed excessive 
sentences when it imposed three consecutive five year sentences ---one with five years fixed, 
another with two years fixed, a third of five years indeterminate--- upon Mr. Yarber' s 
convictions for three counts of video voyeurism when he is a first time offender, expressed 
remorse, and has the support of his family. 
A. Standards of Review 
This Court reviews a sentence alleged to be excessive under the abuse of discretion 
standard. ,<.,'tate v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271,276, 1 P.3d 299,304 (Ct.App. 2000). On appeal, Mr. 
Yarber has the burden to show that his sentence is unreasonable upon the facts of his case and, 
thus, an abuse of discretion. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490 (1992); 
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982). A sentence of confinement is 
reasonable if it appears at the time of sentencing that confinement is necessary "to accomplish 
the primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution applicable to a given case." State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 
565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App. 1982). Where, as here, the sentence is alleged to be 
excessively harsh, the Court conducts an independent review of the record, having regard for the 
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. 
S'tate v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct.App. 1982). The Court considers 
the length of the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 
391 (2007). 
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B. Sentence Imposed 
The State recommended a sentence of eight years fixed followed by 17 years 
indeterminate. (Tr., p. 551, Ls.7-12.) Defense counsel asked the court to consider probation or 
impose a unified sentence of 12 years, with three years fixed, and retain jurisdiction. (Tr., p. 
567, L.24-p. 568, L.7.) 
The district judge found probation "out of the question" because Mr. Yarber "allegedly 
has" an "obsessive-compulsive disorder" and the court did not "know that fYarber] wouldn't 
attempt to do this to [K.B.] again or to a ne,v girlfriend:' (Tr., p. 575, Ls.2-8.) The com1 also 
thought ·'probation would not give him the message"' that this is a big deal and expressed concern 
that Mr. Yarber might be able to figure out where K.B. is living now. (Tr., p. 575, Ls. 10-20). 
The district judge also declined to retain jurisdiction, because "[p Jrobation is not on the table," 
and the judge felt there was "enough information to determine what to do." (Tr., p. 575 L.21 -
p.576, L.2.) 
Instead, the court sentenced Mr. Yarber to a combined 15 year sentence, with seven years 
fixed, as follows: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Count One: five years fixed; 
Count Two: a unified five years, with two fixed and three indeterminate, 
consecutive to Count One; 
Count Three: five years indeterminate, consecutive to Counts One and Two; 
Count Four: five years indeterminate, concurrently with Counts One, Two, and 
Three; 
Count Five: five years indeterminate, concurrently with Counts One, Two, Three, 
and Four; 
Count Seven: one year, concurrently with all other counts; and 
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• Count Eight: six months, concurrently with all other counts. 
(Tr., p. 576, L.20 - p. 578, L.4; R., pp. 142-47) The court also imposed a $50,000 fine on Count 
One and $4,405.48 in restitution. (Tr., p. 578, Ls. 5-6; R., p. 146 & pp. 167-68). 
C. Argument 
The sentencing objectives are: ( 1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual 
and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution 
for wrongdoing. State v. Charboneau, 861 P.2d 67, 69124 Idaho 497,499 (1993). Mr. Yarber 
submits that 15 years of confinement is more than necessary to accomplish these objectives, 
particularly in light of his status as a first-time offender. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has ''recognized that the first offender should be accorded 
more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal." S'tate v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 673 (1998) 
(quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by S'tate v. 
Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227 (1971)); see also State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982). Additionally, 
Idaho's appellate courts have reduced sentences when the sentencing court has not given 
sufficient consideration to a defendant's good character, status as a first time offender, sincere 
expression of remorse, amenability to treatment, and family support. S'ee also State v. Payne, 
146 Idaho 548, 569-70, 199 P.3d 123, 144-45 (2008) (mental health issues can be a mitigating 
sentencing factor). For instance, in State v. Shideler, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a 
sentence of imprisonment on the defendant's first felony (a bank robbery committed with a 
shotgun) from an indeterminate term not to exceed twenty years to an indeterminate term not to 
exceed twelve years. Id., 103 Idaho 593,595,651 P.2d 527,529 (1982). Similar to Mr. Yarber, 
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the defendant in S'hideler had no prior history of any criminal activity.6 Id. The Court also relied 
on the defendant having accepted responsibility for his acts, and that his family and employer 
had "shown considerable interest in his future." ld.7 
l lcre, Mr. Yarber admitted that he made several fake Craigslist postings usmg the 
pictures K.B. sent him and that he "took it a step further by giving her address to some of the 
respondents." (PSI, p. 6.) He felt '·horrible", "embarrassed by [hisJ actions," and recognized he 
"should have used [his] brain instead of [his] heart." Id. Mr. Yarber's mother confirmed that he 
was "ashamed and embarrassed" of his actions and that he had always found it difficult to 
express his feelings to her in the past, but it "[h]is remorse was obvious." PSI, p. 9. She also 
reported that her son "has always been a good law abiding person and his actions were totally out 
of character." PSI, p. 9. She noted Mr. Yarber "has no prior history of any type of discipline in 
school, at work or with legal authorities," and that she believes the breakup of his long term 
relationship after 14 years was "devastating to him" and amounted to "extenuating 
5 The Pre sentence Investigator reports that the instant crimes were the basis for Mr. Yarber' s 
"first arrest", but he had reported being cited and paying a fine for failing to stop at a stop sign in 
2004 in New York. PSI, p. 7. 
7 Other cases in which the appellate courts have reduced sentences rely on similar 
considerations. In State v. Carrasco, the Court of Appeals reduced two concurrent indetenninate 
thirty year prison tem1s imposed on two counts of delivery of cocaine to two concurrent 
indeterminate terms not to exceed twenty years. Id., 114 Idaho 348, 757 P.2d 211 (Ct.App. 
1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 787 P.2d 281 (1990). The Court explained that: 
(1) the defendant "had no previous criminal record; 2) the record did not reveal any drug 
transactions other than those with police officers; 3) [the defendant] had presented a letter from 
the chief of police in his home town and signed by fitty-one other people which attested to his 
good character; and 4) !the defendant] had acknowledged the wrongfulness of his acts and 
expressed contrition f<Jr them." State v. Rodriguez, 132 ldaho 261,265,971 P.2d 327,331 (Ct. 
App. 1998). 
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circumstances." Id. Mr. Yarber commented to the court at sentencing: I know my actions are 
inexcusable. I wish I could take all my actions back but I can't. I'll have to live with the horrible 
decisions I have made for the rest of my life. I am thankful that [K.B.] was not physically 
harmed as a result of my actions .... All I can do at this point is tell [K.B.] that I am sorry." 
(PSI, p. 14).8 Compare State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209,824 P.2d 135, 140 (Ct. App. 1991) 
(determining that '·a total aggregate term of thi1iy years" on two counts of sexual abuse of a child 
was "unduly harsh under the circumstances of this case", including the defendant's "expression 
of remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his willingness to accept treatment 
and other positive attributes of his character"). 
Mr. Yarber·s mother also reported that he "has full time employment waiting for him'' 
and that he is "honest" and "hard working".9 (PSI, p. 9.) S'ee also PSI, p. 12 (reporting that Mr. 
Yarber may have a job at Denison Kwik Fill in New York). Additionally, Mr. Yarber 
recognized that be needed counseling and therapy and he identified that he had a problem letting 
8 Despite these statements demonstrating that Mr. Yarber understands K.B. could have been 
physically harmed and wants to tell K.B. he is sorry, the Presentence Investigator opined that 
"[ilt did not appear [Mr. Yarber] grasped the potential deadly outcome his black mail could have 
produced." (PSI, p. 17.) Moreover, Mr. Yarber expressed understanding that his actions were 
"fi]nexcusable", but the Presentence Investigator took his explanation of what he did to K.B., 
and why he might have done it (i.e., he "lost it" when she cut off contact after he went from 
seeing her every day for 14 years to "nothing"), to mean that he blamed the victim for his 
actions. (Compare PSI, pp. 6, 14, 17.) He testified that he felt "[h]orrible" when K.B. ended 
their relationship and would not talk to him because he "lost [his] best friend". (Tr., p. 462.) Mr. 
Yarber submits that his statements in the PSI demonstrate that he understood what he did was 
wrong and inexcusable, but he was trying to explain his actions and the events that he thinks 
might have led to his actions, and did not intend his comments to place blame on K.B. 
9 To the extent Mr. Yarber had gaps in employment, it was due in part to his moving to different 
states to accommodate K.B.'s career. See Tr., p. 290-91 (K.B testimony); Tr., p. 40-45 
(Yarber's testimony). 
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go of his relationship with K.B. and not being able to deal well with change. (PSI, p. 12.) 
Moreover, Dr. Bill Arnold completed a Forensic Psychological Examination Report on Mr. 
Yarber. (PSI, Exhibit.) In summarizing this report the Presentence Investigator noted that Mr. 
Yarber "believed his parents and sister were emotionally supportive of him and wanted him to 
come home" and he "expressed remorse for the crimes he committed and the pain he caused the 
victim". (PSI, p. 15.) 
Although counsel recognizes that the protection of society is the primary objective the 
court may consider, here, the Court did not even mention Yarber's status as a first-time offender, 
that he had not engaged in this type of conduct with others before, or that he had the support of 
his mother and stepfather. Instead, the district court focused almost exclusively on "the harm" 
caused by Mr. Yarber's actions. (Tr., p. 574, L. 20 -- p. 575, L. 1.) The sentencing court also 
expressed concern that Mr. Yarber would be able to figure out where K.B. lives. (Tr., p. 575, 
Ls.14-20.) However, Dr. Arnold reported that Mr. Yarber "presented as a low potential risk for 
future violence." (PSI, p. 16.) Even though, as the sentencing judge pointed out, Mr. Yarber's 
charges did not involve "a series of violent acts," and the judge found the assessment not "all that 
relevant to the Court's consideration", Mr. Yarber submits it is relevant in this context, and in 
general in relation to his risk to reoffend. (See Tr., p. 549, Ls. 8-15.) 
The district court imposed a fixed five year term of imprisonment on Count One, the 
maximum sentence allowed for a video voyeurism crime. Adding on the consecutive unified 
five year sentence, with two years fixed, on Count Two, and the consecutive five year 
indeterminate term on Count Three, Mr. Yarber will be required to serve at least seven years on 
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the fixed portion of his sentences and possibly up to 15 years. Comparing his sentence to five 
offenders with similar characteristics, two were sentenced to probation with the minimum 
median sentence of two years and the maximum median sentence of five years, two were placed 
011 retained jurisdiction, and only one was sentence to "Term with the minimum median sentence 
of [ one I year and the maximum median sentence of [one] year." (PSI, p. I 6.) By comparison, 
Mr. Yarber's sentence is excessive, even if only the sentence of five years fixed 011 Count One is 
considered. Additionally, the recidivism data provided in the PSI indicates that someone with a 
low risk of re-offense who is placed on probation has only a 15.2 percent rate of re-offense while 
someone sent "Directly to Tenn'' had a rate increased to 36.9 percent. (PSI, p. 16.) Thus, Mr. 
Yarber's best option as a low risk offender to not re-offend is probation, which reduces the 
recidivism rate following a prison term by more than half. 
Mr. Yarber submits that all of his sentences should be served concurrently because they 
arise out of a short term series of events involving the same victim and the same photos of her. 
In S'tate v. Amerson, the Idaho Court of Appeals modified two consecutive, determinate 
sentences of twenty-five years each for rape and forcible penetration offenses based on the 
record and "the fact that all three charges arose from a single incident of criminal behavior." 
Amerson, 129 [daho 395, 408, 925 P.2d 399, 412 (Ct. App. 1996). The Court modified the 
consecutive service to two concurrent twenty-five year sentences that it found would 
"sufficiently protect the public interest." Id. The Court of Appeals reached a similar result in 
S'tate v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,824 P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1991), a case where there was not just 
one single incident of behavior or just one victim. The Alberts case involved two sexual abuse 
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incidents that had occurred during the same month but on different dates and involved two 
different victims (the defendant"s two young nephews). Id. at 205, 824 P.2d at 136. The 
appellate court determined that the district court's decision to require consecutive service of the 
two fifteen year sentences, each with five years of minimum confinement, was an abuse of that 
discretion "in light of the circumstances of the crimes and the character and background of the 
defendant." Id. The Court then directed the district court to "enter a modified judgment of 
conviction specifying that the fifteen-year, unified sentences be served concurrently." Id. The 
Court of Appeals has modified consecutive sentences to run concurrently in other cases. See, 
e.g, State v. Hoskins, 131 Idaho 670, 672-73, 962 P.2d 1054, 1056-57 (Ct. App. 1998) 
(defendant was convicted for two counts of writing bad checks and the Court upheld imposition 
of maximum permissible term of three years fixed, where defendant had quickly violated 
probation terms, but also concluded that ordering the maximum sentences to be served 
consecutively made the sentences unduly harsh considering, among other things, the "absence of 
any serious prior criminal record"). 
In summary, Mr. Yarber submits that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing 
him based on its apparent exclusive consideration of the protection of the society and specific 
deterrence, and ignoring his status as a first-time offender or any other considerations of 
mitigation or rehabilitation. He asks that his sentences on the video voyeurism counts be 
reduced, particularly the maximum fixed term imposed on Count One, and that Court modify his 
sentences so that all run concurrently. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Yarber respectfully requests that this Court vacate all five of his convictions for 
video voyeurism. Additionally, he requests that the Court reverse the district court's evidentiary 
rulings. Finally, he asks the Court to reduce his sentences as it deems appropriate or remand his 
cases to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
For the above reasons, Mr. Yarber respectfully requests that this Court vacate his 
conviction. Alternatively, Mr. Yarber respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction 
and remand his case for a new trial. Alternatively, Mr. Yarber respectfully requests that this 
Court reverse the district court's denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal and vacate his 
wnviction. Alternatively, Mr. Yarber respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as 
it deems appropriate. 
DATED this£ day of March, 2015. 
MANWEILER, BREEN, BALL & DA VIS, PLLC. 
By: 
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